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RECENT CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws-Bills and Notes-Forged Indorsement. Suit was
brought by the United States to recover from the Guaranty Trust Company
one hundred and sixty dollars as damages resulting from the payment to the
Trust Company of a check payable to one Macakanja drawn on the Treasury
of the United States. The check was sent to the payee in Jugoslavia, where
the signature of the payee was forged on the back of the check, the check
transferred to a Jugoslavian bank, a bona fide purchaser for value, which
subsequently transferred it to the defendant. Under the laws of Jugoslavia
a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument on which there has been a
forged indorsement secures good title to the instrument. Held, the law of
Jugoslavia governs the validity of the transfer.1
Although the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Statute has removed the
major differences in the law of commercial paper in the states of the United
States, nevertheless, wide divergencies continue to exist between the rules of
this country and those of other countries, particularly the rules of civil law
countries. 2 The problems involved in this case are not only likely to arise
in cases involving commercial paper, but the rules applicable to such paper
are to a large extent applicable also to the transfer and title of movable
chattels.
It is now agreed that by the weight of authority the law of the place of
execution determines the validity of the instrument, both as to matters of
form and of capacity.3 It also determines whether or not the instrument is
negotiable. 4 The place of execution thus governs defenses arising out of the
original making or discounting of a negotiable instrument. 5 The law of the
place where the instrument or chattel is at the time of the transfer, however,
determines the validity and effect of the transfer, as well as the defenses
which grow out of the circumstances of the transfer. 6 Matters pertaining
to payment, such as demand, notice of dishonor and sufficiency of presentment are governed by the law of the place of payment. 7 This is an aspect
of the general conflicts of law principle that the place of performance governs matters concerning performance of a contract. 8 The check was both
drawn and made payable in the District of Columbia and therefore the law
of that place would have determined the formal and essential validity of the
check, the interpretation of the contract and the incidents of the obligation,
as well as the questions concerning payment.
1United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York (1934), 55 S. Ct. 221.
2 Lorenzen, "The Rules of Conflict of Laws Applicable to Bills and Notes" (1917),
1 Minn. L.Rev. 10.
3 Greenlee v. Hardin (1930), 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777, 71 A. L. R. 741; Tilden v.
Blain (1874), 88 U. S. 247, 22 L. Ed. 632; Scudder v. Union National Bank (1875),
91 U. S.406, 23 L. Ed. 245; Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract"
(1910), 23 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260; American Law Institute Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 336.
4 Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried (1934), 54 S.Ct 813, 78 L. Ed. 939; American Law
Institute Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 334.
GAmerican Law Institute Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 334.
6 Embirocos v. Anglo-American Bank (1905), 1 K. B. Div. 677; Weissman v.
Banque de Bruxelles (1930), 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 885; American Law Institute
Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 349.
7 Wooley v. Lyon (1886), 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885; Gurnsey v. Imperial Bank of
Canada (1911), 188 F. 300; Price v. Indseth (1883), 106 U. S.546, 27 L. Ed. 254;
American Law Institute Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 369.
sLouis Louis-Dreyfus v. Patersen Steamships (1930), 43 F. (2d) 824; Thompson
v. Lakewood City Development Co. (1919), 174 N. Y. S.825, 188 App. Div. 996; Peak v.
International Harvester Co. of America (1916), 194 Mo. App. 128, 186 S.W. 574;
American Law Institute Restatement of Conflicts, Sec. 355.
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The court in the principal case, in deciding that the law of the place of
the check at the time of the transfer governed the validity of the-transfer,
undoubtedly applied the correct conflicts of law rule. The trans'fer of the
chidck or other negotiable instrument creates a separate contract from the one
made by the. maker and the payee, and the rights and liabilities created by the
new contract between the transferor and transferee are governed by the law
of the place where such transfer is made.9 Since by the law of Jugoslavia a
bona fide purchased for value without notice of the forgery acquired good
title to the check and the rights to its proceeds, the bank purchasing the check
acquired all the rights the original payee bad against the United States. The
indorsement to the New York bank gave it the rights the indorsor had as
against the prior holders and the maker. The New York Guaranty Trust
Company, having obtained good title to the check, would be entitled to retain
the proceeds paid to it by the federal reserve bank.
The Supreme Court in saying, "under established principles of conflicts
of law, adopted by both federal and state courts, the validity of the transfer
of a chattel brought into the country by the consent of the owner is governed by its law; and that rule applies to negotiable instruments" seems to
infer that if the check were taken into Jugoslavia without the consent of the
owner, the law of the District of Columbia would apply. Some cases do make
this distinction,' 0 and it seems to be a valid one, because by such consent the
owner subjects himself to the law of the state into which the chattel is taken.
C.L. C.

ConstitutionalLaw-Chain Store License Tax As Applicable To Gasoline
Filling Stations. The legislature of West Virginia passed a law whereby all

persons and corporations operating or maintaining a store as therein' defined
were required to obtain an annual license from the state tax commissioner.
The license fee was graduated according to the number of stores. The result was to cast upon the complainant and competing chains in the same
business a much heavier burden than that borne by others in the same
business. The complainant took the position that the taxes were illegal,
first, because the gasoline stations were not stores within the meaning of the
statute, and, second, because even though they were, the imposition of such a
tax was a denial to the complainant of the immunities secured by the equal
protection clause of the United States and State Constitutions. The district
court decided that the tax constituted a denial to the complainant of the equal
protection of the laws and also that gasoline stations were not stores within
the meaning of the statute. The decree enjoined the payment of the contested fees into the treasury and ordered restitution. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, that gasoline filling
stations are stores or mercantile establishments within the meaning of the
statute and that statute does not deny to the complainant the equal protection
of the laws.'
The court decides that a gasoline filling station falls within the genus,
"store", or within the summum genus, "mercantile establishment", apparently
on the ground that gasoline, automobile accessories and other petroleum
9 Embirocos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank (1905), 1 K. B. Div. 677; Weissman v.
Banque de Bruxelles (1930), 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 885.
10 Lees v. Harding, Whitman & Co. (1905), 68 N. J. Eq. 622, 60 Atl. 352; Sargent
v. Usher (1875), 55 N. H. 287. It is to be noted, however, that the American Law
Irstitute Restatement of Conflicts makes no such distinction.
' Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (1935), 55 Sup. Ct. 333.

